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County of Allegheny v. ACLU: Justice O'Connor's Endorsement
Test
Over forty years ago the United States Supreme Court announced in Ever-
son v. Board of Education I that the first amendment's establishment clause; was
"intended to erect 'a wall of separation between church and State.' 3 The
Court concluded in the same case that the amendment also commands that a
state "cannot hamper its citizens in the free exercise of their own religion."'4
During the past four decades, the Court has struggled to accommodate these
countervailing values, often choosing one over the other.5 The Court has devel-
oped various tests to assist in its interpretation of establishment clause cases.
Yet no single test or common terminology has dominated the Court's analyses.
To the contrary, the Court repeatedly has emphasized its "unwillingness to be
confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area." 6
County of Allegheny v. ACLU 7 represents the Court's most recent effort to
formulate a feasible establishment clause doctrine. While several recent estab-
lishment clause opinions reflect consideration of Justice O'Connor's "endorse-
ment test," Allegheny is the first time the Court has adopted it formally. This
Note traces the Court's struggle to develop a workable establishment clause doc-
trine and discusses the endorsement test, culminating with its adoption in Alle-
gheny. The Note concludes that the endorsement test provides a sound
analytical framework for achieving consistency in future establishment clause
cases.
During the 1986 holiday season Allegheny County, Pennsylvania permitted
two religious groups to display holiday scenes in downtown Pittsburgh.8 A Ro-
man Catholic group provided a creche, a depiction of the manger scene in Beth-
lehem shortly after the birth of Jesus Christ.9 The crehe was displayed on the
1. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
2. The establishment clause provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .. " U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first
amendment applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296, 303 (1940); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
3. Everson, 330 U.S. at 18 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)).
4. Id. at 16. The Court's observations accurately reflect the dichotomy inherent within the
first amendment. As Professor Marshall has observed:
The first amendment's religion clause states: "Congress shall make no law respecting the
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." Literally, then, the first
amendment may be read as simultaneously requiring that religion be accorded no special
treatment (the establishment clause) and that it be accorded deferential treatment (the free
exercise clause).
Marshall, "We Know It When We See It" The Supreme Court And Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L.
REv. 495, 504-05 (1986).
5. See infra notes 41-85 and accompanying text.
6. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984); see also Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672,
677-78 (1971) ("no single constitutional caliper" to determine church-state issues); Committee for
Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773 (1973) (citing Tilton).
7. 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989) (plurality opinion).
8. Id. at 3093-94 (plurality opinion).
9. Id. (plurality opinion).
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grand staircase of the Allegheny County Courthouse. 10 The Courthouse is
owned by Allegheny County and is its seat of government."1 The creche in-
cluded representations of the infant Jesus, Mary, Joseph, shepherds, farm ani-
mals, wise men, and an angel bearing a banner proclaiming "Gloria in Excelsis
Deol" 12 Attached to a fence surrounding the scene was a plaque stating: "This
Display Donated by the Holy Name Society." 13 Poinsettias and a small ever-
green tree donated by the county completed the scene.14 No other figures or
decorations appeared on the grand staircase. 15 The county used the cr~che in its
annual Christmas carol program, which it dedicated to world peace.
16
The second display, located in the entrance of the City-County Building,
17
included an eighteen-foot Chanukah' s menorah owned by Chabad, a Jewish
group, and erected and maintained by the city. 19 Adjacent to the menorah was
a forty-five foot Christmas tree also provided by the city.20 A sign at the foot of
the tree bore the Mayor's name and read "Salute to Liberty." 21
The Greater Pittsburgh Chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) filed suit against the county and the city, seeking to enjoin the displays
of the creche and menorah.22 The ACLU claimed that each of the displays
violated the establishment clause of the first amendment. 23 The United States
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania denied the ACLU's re-
quest for a permanent injunction, concluding that the "displays had.., secular
purpose[s]" and "did not create an excessive entanglement of government with
10. The grand staircase is "[t]he 'main,' 'most beautiful,' and 'most public' part of the court-
house." Id. at 3093 (plurality opinion).
11. Id. (plurality opinion). The City of Pittsburgh is in Allegheny County. Id. at 3094 (plural-
ity opinion).
12. Id. at 3094 (plurality opinion). One scene represented the Biblical description of the birth
of Christ. According to the Gospel of Luke, an angel appeared to the shepherds to announce the
birth of the Messiah: "'[S]uddenly there was with the angel a multitude of the heavenly host prais-
ing God, and saying, Glory to God in the highest, and on earth peace, good will towards men.'" Id.
at 3094 n.5 (plurality opinion) (quoting Luke 2:13-14 (King James Version)).
13. Id. at 3094 (plurality opinion).
14. Id. (plurality opinion).
15. Id. (plurality opinion).
16. Id. (plurality opinion).
17. The City-County Building is jointly owned by the City of Pittsburgh and Allegheny
County. Id. (plurality opinion).
18. The word "Chanukah," sometimes spelled "Hanukkah," comes from the Hebrew word for
"dedication." Id. at 3096 n.l (plurality opinion). "According to the Jewish tradition, on the 25th
of Kislev in 164 B.C.E. (before the common era), the Maccabees rededicated the Temple of Jerusa-
lem after recapturing it from the Greeks ... in the course of a political rebellion." Id. at 3095
(plurality opinion). Chanukah is the holiday that celebrates that event. Id. at 3096 (plurality opin-
ion). It is a cultural as well as a religious holiday. Id. (plurality opinion). In Justice Blackmun's
words, "[i]n this country, the tradition of giving Chanukah gelt has taken on greater importance
because of the temporal proximity of Chanukah to Christmas.... This socially heightened status of
Chanukah reflects its cultural or secular dimension." Id. at 3097 (plurality opinion).
19. Id. at 3095, 3097 (plurality opinion).
20. Id. at 3094-95 (plurality opinion).
21. Id. at 3095 (plurality opinion). "Beneath the title, the sign stated: 'During this holiday
season, the City of Pittsburgh salutes liberty. Let these festival lights remind us that we are the
keepers of the flame of liberty and our legacy of freedom.'" Id. (plurality opinion).
22. Id. at 3097-98 (plurality opinion).
23. Id. at 3098 (plurality opinion); see supra note 2 (text of the establishment clause).
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religion."'2 4 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed,
holding that the cr6che and the menorah had the impermissible effect of endors-
ing religion. 25 The court noted that each display was "located at or in a public
building devoted to core functions of government" and further observed that
neither display had been "subsumed by a larger display of non-religious
items." 2 6
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of
appeals regarding the creche, but reversed its judgment regarding the meno-
rah.27 The plurality, speaking through Justice Blackmun, adopted an approach
suggested by Justice O'Connor in her concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly,
28
and concluded that its present task in Allegheny was to "determine whether the
display of the creche and the menorah, in their respective 'particular physical
settings,' ha[d] the effect of endorsing or disapproving religious beliefs."' 29
With respect to the creche display, the Court held that by permitting the
display the county sent an unmistakable message to the public that it supported
and promoted the creche's religious message. 30 Justice Blackmun observed that
the words "Gloria in Excelsis Deol," the absence of nonreligious items, and the
location of the display had the combined effect of "endorsing a patently Chris-
tian message: Glory to God for the birth of Jesus Christ."'3 1 As for the menorah
in the second display, however, the Court held that the display did not have the
effect of endorsing religion.32 Recognizing that the tree and the menorah repre-
sented both Christmas and Chanukah, Justice Blackmun framed the relevant
question as "whether the combined display of the tree, the sign, and the meno-
rah ha[d] the effect of endorsing both Christian and Jewish faiths."'33 The Court
concluded that the display did not have this effect; rather, the display "simply
recognize[d] that both Christmas and Chanukah are part of the same winter-
24. Appendix to Petition for Certiorari at 5a, Allegheny (No. 87-2050) (unpublished district
court opinion). The district court relied on Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). Id. For a
discussion of Lynch see infra notes 76-96 and accompanying text.
25. Allegheny v. ACLU, 842 F.2d 655, 663 (3d Cir. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 109 S. Ct.
3086 (1989). The court of appeals distinguished Lynch. Id. at 660.
26. Id. at 662. The court's comment that neither display was "subsumed by a larger display of
non-religious items" refers to Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 686-87 (1984) (inclusion of "one
passive [religious] symbol"-a crkche-in larger holiday display not an establishment clause
violation).
27. Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3093 (plurality opinion).
28. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
29. Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3103 (plurality opinion) (citing Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692-94
(O'Connor, J., concurring)).
30. Id. at 3104 (plurality opinion).
31. Id. at 3105 (plurality opinion).
32. Id. at 3115 (plurality opinion).
33. Id. at 3113 (plurality opinion). Justice O'Connor disagreed with the plurality's application
of the endorsement test with respect to the menorah. Id. at 3122 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In
Justice O'Connor's view, Justice Blackmun's framing of the issue disregarded "the fact that the
Christmas tree is a predominantly secular symbol and, more significantly, obscures the religious
nature of the menorah and the holiday of Chanukah." Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). The relevant
question, she concluded, was whether the menorah display, "the religious symbol of a religious holi-
day, next to a Christmas tree and a sign saluting liberty[,] sends a message of government endorse-
ment of Judaism or whether it sends a message of pluralism and freedom to choose one's own
beliefs." Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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holiday season, ;vhich has attained a secular status in our society."'34
Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and
Scalia, wrote a bitter dissent,3 5 arguing that the majority's view of the establish-
ment clause reflected an unjustified hostility toward religion.36 Citing a long line
of accommodationist 37 cases, Justice Kennedy argued that a government's dis-
play of a religious symbol is constitutional unless it "advances religion to such a
degree that it actually 'establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to
do so.' "s38 Mere governmental accommodation of an existing symbol, he con-
tinued, does not violate the establishment clause "unless it benefits religion in a
way more direct and more substantial than practices that are accepted in our
national heritage."'39 Applying this standard to the creche and. menorah, Justice
Kennedy concluded that, by permitting the displays, "the city and county had
sought to do no more than 'celebrate the season,' and to acknowledge ... the
historical background and the religious as well as secular nature of the
Chanukah and Christmas holidays." 4
34. Id. at 3113 (plurality opinion). Ironically, the plurality seems to have misapplied Justice
O'Connor's test. See supra note 33 (suggesting that the plurality's first mistake was framing the issue
incorrectly). As Justice O'Connor explained:
Justice Blackmun's opinion acknowledges that a Christmas tree alone conveys no endorse-
ment of Christian beliefs, it formulates the question posed by Pittsburgh's combined dis-
play of the tree and the menorah as whether the display "has the effect of endorsing both
Christian and Jewish faiths, or rather simply recognizes that both Christmas and
Chanukah are part of the same winter-holiday season, which has attained a secular status
in our society." . . . The opinion is correct to recognize that the religious holiday of
Chanukah has historical and cultural as well as religious dimensions, and that there may be
certain "secular aspects" to the holiday. But that is not to conclude... that Chanukah has
become a "secular holiday" in our society.... Under Justice Blackmun's view, however,
the menorah "has been relegated to the role of a neutral harbinger of the holiday season,"
almost devoid of any religious significance.
Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3122 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
35. Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3134 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The dissent concurred in judgment
with respect to the menorah. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
36. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
37. The accommodationist approach prohibits governmental support of one religious sect over
another, but permits neutral government support of religion as a general institution. See Zorach v.
Clausen, 343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952) (upholding state law permitting public schools to release stu-
dents during school hours to attend off-campus religious instruction); Comment, Constitutional
Law--American Civil Liberties Union v. City of Birmingham: Establishment Clause Scrutiny of a
Nativity Scene Display, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 114, 117-18 (1986); infra note 46 (comparing
accommodationist and absolutist approaches).
38. Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3136 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). In determining whether an imper-
missible degree of religious advancement was present in Allegheny, Justice Kennedy cited other types
of church-state contacts that the Court has allowed in the past. Id. at 3137-38 (Kennedy, J., dissent-
ing). For example, in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 683 (1984), the Court upheld the display of a
cr~ehe despite the fact that "the display advance[d] religion in a sense." The Court reasoned that
"not every law that confers an 'indirect,' 'remote,' or 'incidental' benefit upon [religion] is, for that
reason alone, constitutionally invalid." Id. (quoting Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty
v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 771 (1973)). Likewise in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), the
Court upheld the legislative practice of employing a chaplain because "legislative prayer presents no
more potential for establishment than the provision of school transportation, beneficial grants for
higher education, or tax exemptions for religious organizations." Marsh, 463 U.S. at 791 (citations
omitted).
39. Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3138 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
40. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy concluded that the government's interest in
"celebrat[ing] the season" fell "well within the tradition of government accommodation and ac-
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Over the last four decades the Court repeatedly has been asked to define the
limits of the establishment clause. The Court first examined the establishment
clause in Everson v. Board of Education.4 1 In Everson the Court evaluated a
New Jersey statute authorizing the use of tax proceeds to pay for transportation
of students attending parochial schools.42 Justice Black, writing for the major-
ity, boldly pronounced that "[n]o tax in any amount, large or small, can be
levied to support any religious activities." 43 Nevertheless, the Court upheld the
statute.44 Noting that the state did not contribute money directly to the schools,
the majority concluded that the legislation merely provided a "general program
to help parents get their children, regardless of their religion, safely and expedi-
tiously to and from accredited schools."'45
The Court's holding and reasoning in Everson reflected the competing ten-
sions inherent in the establishment clause and manifested in the absolutist and
accommodationist approaches.46 On one hand, Justice Black declared that
knowledgement of religion that has marked our history from the beginning." Id. (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
41. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Although a handful of earlier Supreme Court cases indirectly touched
upon establishment clause issues, Everson is the foundation for contemporary analysis of the clause.
See Beschle, The Conservative as Liberal: The Religion Clauses, Liberal Neutrality, and the Approach
of Justice O'Connor, 62 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 151, 152 n.4. (1987); see, e.g., Cochrane v. Louisiana
State Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930); Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366 (1918). It was not
until 1940, in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940), that the Supreme Court held that
the first amendment is applicable to the states.
42. Everson, 330 U.S. at 3.
43. Id. at 16. The full text of Justice Black's pronouncement is as follows:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least this:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can
force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or
force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for
entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-at-
tendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious
activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to
teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or
secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In
the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to
erect "wall of separation between church and State."
Id. at 15-16. Justice Black's words represent the absolutist position. Additional cases reflecting the
absolutist position include Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205 (1963) (invalidating
state law requiring Bible reading in public schools); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962) (invali-
dating state law prescribing official prayer in public schools).
44. Everson, 330 U.S. at 18. The Court noted the conflicting tensions underlying its analysis:
New Jersey cannot consistently with the "establishment of religion" clause of the First
Amendment contribute tax-raised funds to the support of an institution which teaches the
tenets and faith of any church.... [However], we must be careful, in protecting the citizens
of New Jersey against state-established churches, to be sure that we do not inadvertently
prohibit New Jersey from extending its general state law benefits to all its citizens without
regard to their religious belief. Measured by these standards, we cannot say that the First
Amendment prohibits New Jersey from spending tax-raised funds to pay the bus fares of
parochial school pupils as part of general program under which it pays the fares of pupils
attending public and other schools.
Id. at 16-17. In his dissent, Justice Jackson compared the majority's holding to Byron's Julia who,
"whispering 'I will ne'er consent,'---consented." Id. at 19 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 18.
46. The establishment clause dichotomy consists of the absolutist and accommodationist ap-
proaches. The absolutist approach is associated with the "wall of separation" metaphor, and de-
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"[tihe First Amendment has erected a wall between church and state. That wall
must be high and impregnable." 47 On the other hand, he continued, the amend-
ment also "commands that [the state] cannot hamper its citizens in the free
exercise of their own religion."'48
Five years after Everson, the Court adopted an accomodationist approach
in Zorach v. Clauson.49 Zorach addressed the constitutionality of a New York
City program permitting public schools to release students during the day to
attend off-campus religious instruction sponsored by local religious groups. 50
Noting that the first amendment requires the "complete and unequivocal"5 1 sep-
aration of church and state, the Court nevertheless upheld the program.5 2 Tem-
pering the absolutist approach with a philosophy of accommodation, the
majority emphasized that "separation" does not require the state to be suspi-
cious, hostile, or unfriendly toward religion.53 The Court concluded that by
encouraging theological instruction and cooperating with religious authorities,
the state had followed the "best of our traditions" by showing "respect for the
religious nature of our people."'54
In the decade following Zorach, the Supreme Court shifted its position and
adopted an absolutist approach.5 5 In Lemon v. Kurtzman 5 6 the Court used ab-
solutist policies to articulate a three-pronged test for establishment clause viola-
tions.5 7 Under the Lemon test a statute or government practice will survive an
establishment clause challenge only if it meets the following requirements:
"First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its-principal
or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religions... ;
finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with
religion.' "s58 The Lemon Court applied its newly formulated test to Rhode Is-
land and Pennsylvania statutes, each of which provided state funds to private
elementary schools. 59 The Rhode Island statute provided a pay supplement for
teachers of nonsecular subjects in all private schools. 6° The Pennsylvania stat-
mands complete separation between church and state. The accommodationist approach prohibits
government support of one religious sect over another, but permits neutral government support of
religion as a general institution. See Comment, supra note 37, at 117-22 (tracing history of Court's
establishment decisions, emphasizing shift between absolutist and accommodationist approaches).
47. Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.
48. Id. at 16.
49. 343 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1952).
50. Id. at 308.
51. Id. at 312.
52. Id. at 315.
53. Id. at 312.
54. Id. at 314.
55. See supra text accompanying note 47 (defining the absolutist approach).
56. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
57. Id. at 612-13.
58. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
59. Id. at 606.
60. Id. at 607. The Rhode Island Salary Supplement Act rested on "the legislative finding that
the quality of education available in nonpublic elementary schools ha[d] been jeopardized by the
rapidly rising salaries needed to attract competent and dedicated teachers." Id.
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ute authorized direct aid to private schools for teaching secular subjects.6 1 Ap-
plying the first prong of the new test, the Court found that because each statute
intended to enhance the quality of secular education, each had a secular pur-
pose.62 The Court declined to decide whether either statute had a primary effect
of advancing or inhibiting religion, choosing instead to base its decision on the
entanglement prong, the very existence of which reflects a concern with absolu-
tist values. 63 Noting that the government support authorized by the statutes
necessarily required substantial state supervision, 64 the Court held that each
statute fostered an impermissible degree of entanglement between government
and religion.65 Therefore, the Court concluded, each statute violated the estab-
lishment clause. 66
Twelve years later in Marsh v. Chambers67 the Supreme Court once again
shifted to an accommodationist approach. Marsh involved the Nebraska Legis-
lature's practice of opening each session with a prayer by a state-paid chaplain. 68
Without explanation, the Marsh Court chose not to apply the Lemon test.69
Justice Burger, writing for the majority, held that the practice of legislative
prayer did not violate the establishment clause.70 He concluded that,
[i]n light of the unambiguous and unbroken history of more than 200
years, there can be no doubt that the practice of opening legislative
sessions with prayer has become part of the fabric of our society.... It
is not, in these circumstances, an "establishment" of religion or a step
toward establishment. 71
By 1984 the Supreme Court had yet to formulate a comprehensive and co-
hesive test to resolve establishment clause inquiries. The Court's treatment of
establishment clause cases during the previous four decades had been character-
ized by dramatic shifts between inconsistent analyses. 72 Although the Lemon
61. Id. at 609-10.
62. Id. at 613.
63. Id. at 613-14. The Court explained that its conclusion that the statutes fostered an imper-
missible degree of entanglement between government and religion precluded the need to decide
whether the statutes had the primary effects of advancing or inhibiting religion. Id.
64. Id. at 619-21.
65. Id. at 614-15.
66. Id.
67. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
68. Id. at 784-85. The Nebraska Legislature's practice was challenged by a taxpayer of Ne-
braska who was also a member of the legislature. Id. at 785.
69. Justice Brennan's dissent, which argued persistently for application of the Lemon test,
sought to explain the majority's failure to apply the established formula:
The Court makes no pretense of subjecting Nebraska's practice of legislative prayer to any
of the formal "tests" that have traditionally structured our inquiry under the Establish-
ment Clause. That it fails to do so, is, in a sense, a good thing, for it simply confirms that
the Court is carving out an exception to the Establishment Clause rather than reshaping
Establishment Clause doctrine to accommodate legislative prayer.
Id. at 796 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 792. Justice Brennan criticized the majority for abandoning the Lemon test: "In
sum, I have no doubt that, if any group of law students were asked to apply the principles of Lemon
to the question of legislative prayer, they would nearly unanimously find the practice to be unconsti-
tutional." Id. at 800-01 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 792.
72. See, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 791 (1983) (adopting accommodationist ap-
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test initially offered hope for consistency in these cases, the Court wavered in its
application. The Court sometimes stated that the Lemon test was indispensa-
ble;73 at other times that it was a helpful signpost;74 and, at still other times, the
Court reserved the right to disregard it altogether.75
In 1984 the Court for the first time considered the constitutionality of a
state-sponsored nativity scene in Lynch v. Donnelly.76 The seasonal display,
owned and erected by the city of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, was located in a park
owned by a nonprofit organization and located in the center of a shopping dis-
trict in Pawtucket. It included many figures and decorations normally associ-
ated with the Christmas season. 77 In addition to a traditional cr~che, the
display included: a Santa Claus house, reindeer, Santa's sleigh, a Christmas tree,
carolers, a clown, and a large banner reading "SEASONS GREETINGS. '78
Relying on Zorach and Marsh, the Court expressly rejected the absolutist con-
cept of a "wall of separation" between church and state.79 To Chief Justice
Burger and the majority, the pertinent question was not whether governmental
conduct confers benefits or gives special recognition to religion-as an absolutist
approach would dictate-but whether such conduct "establishes a religion or
religious faith, or tends to do so."' s The Lynch Court applied the first prong of
the Lemon test and determined that the creche had the secular purpose of de-
picting the historical origins of the holiday.81 It then applied Lemon's second
prong to determine whether the cr~che had the primary effect of conferring a
substantial benefit on religion in general or upon Christianity in particular.8 2
proach to the exclusion of the Lemon test); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971) (shifting
to a test founded on absolutist principles); Zorach v. Clausen, 343 U.S. 306, 312, 315 (1952) (adop-
tion of accommodationist approach emphasizing first amendment's command of government
nonhostility toward religion).
73. See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (striking down Kentucky statute requiring display
of the Ten Commandments in public school classrooms); see also Marshall, supra note 4, at 497
("[A]t, .. times the Court has held that [the Lemon test] must be rigorously applied.").
74. See Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973).
75. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 252 (1982); see also supra notes 67-71 and accompany-
ing text (Marsh Court ignored Lemon test and instead upheld practice of legislative prayer as societal
tradition).
76. 465 U.S. 668, 670-71 (1984).
77. Id. at 671.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 672-78. The Constitution, in the Lynch majority's view, does not require complete
separation between church and state; to the contrary, "it affirmatively mandates accommodation,
not merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility toward any.... [H]ostiity would bring us
into 'war with our national tradition as embodied in the First Amendment's guaranty of the free
exercise of religion.'" Id. at 673 (quoting McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 211-12
(1948)). The Court noted further that, "[i]n [the] modem, complex society, whose traditions and
constitutional underpinnings rest on and encourage diversity and pluralism in all areas, an absolutist
approach in applying the Establishment Clause is simplistic and has been uniformly rejected by the
Court." Id. at 678.
80. Id. at 678.
81. Id. at 681. The Supreme Court held that "the district court erred by focusing almost exclu-
sively on the cr che." Id. at 680. In contrast, the Supreme Court focused its inquiry on the cr6che
in the context of the Christmas holiday season. Id. at 679-80. Thus, the criche served the secular
purpose of allowing the city to celebrate the traditions and historical origins of Christmas. Id. at
680.
82. Id. at 681-82.
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The majority held that inclusion of the creche in the display was no more an
"advancement or endorsement of religion" than other practices the Court had
recognized in the past.8 3 Finally, turning to the third prong of Lemon, the ma-
jority held that the cr6che had not created excessive administrative entangle-
ment between church and state.84 Consequently, the Court held that the display
was constitutional.8 5
In her concurrence in Lynch, Justice O'Connor presented her "endorse-
ment test" for the first time.8 6 This test, she explained, clarified the Lemon test
by modifying the "purpose" and "effect" prongs. 8 7 Under the endorsement test,
a government practice must satisfy both prongs of a two-step inquiry in order to
be constitutional.88 The first inquiry, analogous to the purpose prong of the
Lemon test, focuses on the subjective intent of the government practice and de-
termines "whether the government intends to convey a message of endorsement
or disapproval of religion."8 9 Applying this standard to the Lynch crache, Jus-
tice O'Connor concluded that the city of Pawtucket did not "intend to convey
any message of endorsement of Christianity or disapproval of non-Christian reli-
gions." 90 She reasoned that
[t]he evident purpose of including the cr6che in the larger display was
not promotion of the religious content of the cr6che but celebration of
the public holiday through its traditional symbols. Celebration of pub-
lic holidays, which have cultural significance even if they also have
83. Id. at 681-83. Chief Justice Burger stated:
The Court has made it abundantly clear... that "not every law that confers an 'indirect,'
'remote,' or 'incidental' benefit upon [religion] is, for that reason alone, constitutionally
invalid." Here, whatever benefit there is to one faith or religion or to all religions, is indi-
rect, remote and incidental; display of the creche is no more an advancement or endorse-
ment of religion than the Congressional and executive recognition of the origins of the
Holiday itself as 'Christ's Mass,' or the exhibition of literally hundreds of religious paint-
ings in government supported museums.
Id. at 683 (citations omitted); see also Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786 (1983) (upholding
tradition of legislative prayer); Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 745-67 (1976) (plural-
ity opinion) (upholding noncategorical grants to church-sponsored colleges and universities); Tilton
v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 689 (1971) (upholding federal grants for college buildings at church-
sponsored institutions of higher education combining secular and religious education); Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 315 (1952) (upholding school time release program for religious training);
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (allowing expenditure of public funds for transpor-
tation of students to parochial schools).
84. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 683-85.
85. Id. at 685.
86. Id. at 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
87. Id. at 691 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see supra notes 56-66, and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the Lemon test).
88. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring). An affirmative answer to either prong
results in an establishment clause violation. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). The fact that a practice
does not violate Justice O'Connor's test does not foreclose the possibility that government practice
may still be declared unconstitutional for excessive entanglement between church and state. As
Justice O'Connor recognized in Lynch, "Government can run afoul of [the establishment clause] in
two principal ways. One is excessive entanglement with religious institutions .... The second and
more direct infringement is endorsement or disapproval of religion." Id. at 687-688 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). The endorsement test concentrates on the second principal infringement and leaves the
entanglement prong to the Lemon analysis.
89. Id. at 691 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
90. Id. (O'Connor, J., conctirring).
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religious aspects, is a legitimate secular purpose. 91
The second inquiry of the endorsement test, analogous to the Lemon test's
effect prong, focuses on the objective effect of the government practice and deter-
mines whether the governmental practice actually conveys a message of govern-
mental endorsement or disapproval of religion.92  As Justice O'Connor
explained, the effect prong of the Lemon test should not be interpreted to require
"invalidation of a government practice merely because it in fact causes, even as a
primary effect, advancement or inhibition of religion." 93 "What is crucial," she
concluded, "is that a government practice not have the effect of communicating
a message of government endorsement or disapproval of religion."' 94 In making
this determination, she continued, the "government practice must be judged in
its unique circumstances" to ascertain "whether it constitutes an endorsement or
disapproval of religion."9 5 Applying her new test to the facts of Lynch, Justice
O'Connor concluded that the cr~ehe display did not actually convey the message
that the Pawtucket government "endorse[d] the Christian beliefs represented by
the creche. ' '96
Justice O'Connor took advantage of an opportunity to refine her endorse-
ment test in her concurring opinion in Wallace v. Jaffree.97 In Wallace the
Court addressed the question whether an Alabama statute authorizing a mo-
ment of silence for "meditation or voluntary prayer," violated the establishment
clause.98 Returning to an absolutist position, a majority of the Court applied the
purpose prong of the Lemon test to the Alabama statute. Justice Stevens, writ-
ing for the majority, adopted Justice O'Connor's endorsement terminology,
framing the appropriate question as "whether [the] government's actual purpose
91. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
92. Id. at 690-93 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
93. Id. at 691-92 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor squared this view with the
Court's previous decisions in Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (tax exemption for religious,
educational, and charitable organizations), McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (mandatory
Sunday closing law), and Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (released time from school for off-
campus religious instruction), which she characterized as upholding laws having primary effects of
advancing or inhibiting religion, but which, nonetheless, did not rise to the level of an establishment
clause violation. Id. (O'Connor, 3., concurring).
94. Id. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("It is only practices having [the] effect [of communi-
cating a message of government endorsement or disapproval of religion] whether intentionally or
unintentionally, that make religion relevant, in reality or public perception, to status in the political
community.").
95. Id. at 694 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
96. Id. at 692. (O'Connor, J., 'concurring). Justice O'Connor drew an analogy to a religious
display in a museum setting to clarify her position. A museum setting, "though not neutralizing the
religious content of a religious painting, negates any message of endorsement of that content." Id.
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Likewise, the Pawtucket display celebrates a public holiday and
"[glovernment celebration of the holiday ... generally is not understood to endorse the religious
content of the holiday." Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
97. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
98. Id. at 41-42. The Alabama statute provided:
At the commencement of the first class of each day in all grades in all public schools the
teacher in charge of the room in which each such class is held may announce that a period
of silence not to exceed one minute in duration shall be observed for meditation or volun-
tary prayer, and during any such period no other activities shall be engaged in.
ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1984) declared unconstitutional in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38
(1985).
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is to endorse or disapprove of religion." 99 "Whenever the State itself speaks on
a religious subject," the Court concluded, "one of the questions that we must ask
is 'whether the government intends to convey a message of endorsement or dis-
approval of religion.'"'o The Court then examined the legislative history of
the statute and determined that its purpose was to reinstitute voluntary prayer in
public schools.10 1 The Court held that such a purpose clearly endorsed religion
and that, therefore, the Alabama statute violated the first amendment. 10 2
In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor expounded upon the endorse-
ment principles she had introduced in Lynch.10 3 In her view, the crucial issue
was whether Alabama's moment of silence statute embodied an "impermissible
endorsement of prayer in public schools."I 4 As her Lynch concurrence indi-
cated, the resolution of this issue involves a two-part scrutiny. 10 5 First, the
Court must inquire into the legislature's intent in enacting the statute; second, it
must determine the statute's actual effect.' 0 6 With respect to the first require-
ment, Justice O'Connor stated that the inquiry into the purpose of the moment
of silence law should be deferential and limited. 10 7 Turning to the second re-
99. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 56 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
Although the Court borrowed Justice O'Connor's endorsement terminology from her Lynch concur-
rence, it did not adopt her test. See id. To the contrary, the majority reaffirmed the Lemon test as a
basis of establishment clause inquiry. Id. at 55-56. The Court did, however, use Justice O'Connor's
language to clarify the purpose prong of the Lemon test. See id. at 56. Nevertheless, it fell short of
adopting the endorsement test because it failed to address Justice O'Connor's second inquiry-
whether, irrespective of the government's actual purpose, the practice actually conveys a message of
endorsement or disapproval. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
100. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 60-61.
101. Id. at 56-57. "The sponsor of the bill that became § 16-1-20.1, Senator Donald Holmes,
inserted into the legislative record-apparently without dissent-a statement indicating that the leg-
islation was an 'effort to return voluntary prayer' to the public schools." Id. Senator Holmes later
stated that he did not have any other purpose for introducing the bill. Id. at 57. The State failed to
present any evidence of a secular purpose. Id.
102. Id. at 61.
103. See supra notes 86-96 and accompanying text. Justice O'Connor noted that the Lemon test
has proved problematic. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 68 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Yet she was unwilling
to abandon the test in its entirety. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). Rather, she stated,
[T]he standards announced in Lemon should be reexamined and refined in order to make
them more useful in achieving the underlying purpose of the First Amendment. We must
strive to do more than erect a constitutional "signpost," to be followed or ignored in a
particular case as our predilections may dictate.
Id. at 68-69 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
104. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 70 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor phrased the issue
more narrowly,
The crucial question is whether the State has conveyed or attempted to convey the message
that the children should use the moment of silence for prayer. This question cannot be
answered in the abstract, but instead requires the courts to examine the history, language,
and administration of a particular statute to determine whether it operates as an endorse-
ment of religion.
Id. at 73-74 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
105. See supra notes 86-96 and accompanying text.
106. Id.
107. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 74. See also Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 6 (1974) (courts
must exercise "the most extreme caution" in assessing whether a state statute has proper public
purpose); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 466 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (a court
has no right to psychoanalyze the legislature when determining the intent of the government).
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quirement, Justice O'Connor presented the "objective observer" concept.108
"The relevant issue," she concluded, "is whether an objective observer ac-
quainted with the text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute,
would perceive it as a state endorsement of prayer in public schools."' 1 9 The
courts, Justice O'Connor continued, should assume that this "objective ob-
server" is "acquainted with the Free Exercise Clause and the values it pro-
motes." 110 Applying these principles to the facts, Justice O'Connor would have
held that, through the moment of silence statute, the Alabama legislature had
intended to endorse prayer in public schools."11  She further concluded that the
message actually conveyed to the objective observer was "approval of the child
who select[ed] prayer over other alternatives during a moment of silence." 112
Thus, Justice O'Connor concluded, the Alabama Code did more than permit
prayer during a moment of silence; "[it endorse[d] the decision to pray during a
moment of silence, and accordingly sponsor[ed] a religious exercise." 113
In Allegheny the Court expressly adopted Justice O'Connor's endorsement
test. Unlike the Court's reasoning in Wallace, the Allegheny Court focused on
the effect of the government practice.'1 4 The effect of the display, the Court
noted, "depends upon the message that the government practice communicates:
the question is 'what viewers may fairly understand to be the purpose of the
display.' "115 The answer to this question, the plurality continued, necessarily
depends upon the context in which the display appears. 16 Thus, the Court con-
cluded that the proper question was whether the displays of the creche and me-
norah, "in their respective 'particular settings,' ha[d] the effect of endorsing or
disapproving religious beliefs." With respect to the creche, the Court concluded
that Allegheny County, by permitting the display, had sent the impermissible
message to the viewers that it supported and promoted the Christian faith." 7 In
contrast, the Court found that the display of the menorah did not represent the
108. See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 76 (O'Connor, J., concurring). O'Connor premised the "objective
observer" concept on the belief that the effect of a statute or government practice is not entirely a
question of fact:
[Whether a government activity communicates endorsement of religion is not a question
of simple historical fact. Although evidentiary submissions may help answer it, the ques-
tion is, like the question whether racial or sex-based classifications communicate an in-
dividious message, in large part a legal question to be answered on the basis of judicial
interpretation of social facts.
Id. at 76 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 693-94 (1985)
(O'Connor, J., concurring)).
109. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
110. Id. at 83 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
111. Id. at 76 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
112. Id. at 78 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In light of Justice O'Connor's determination that the
state intended to convey a message of endorsement, any further scrutiny is unnecessary, as a "yes" to
either inquiry constitutes a violation of the establishment clause. Id. at 78 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
113. Id. at 78-79 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
114. Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3102 (plurality opinion).
115. Id. (plurality opinion).
116. Id. (plurality opinion).
117. Id. at 3104 (plurality opinion). ("by permitting the 'display of the cr che in its particular
physical setting,' the county sends an unmistakable message that it supports and promotes the Chris-
tian praise to God that is the cr~che's religious message").
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government's endorsement of religious faith.118 The distinguishing factor be-
tween the creche and menorah displays was the context in which each was
presented. 19 The Court concluded that the display of the menorah, unlike the
creche display, simply represented a recognition of cultural diversity: "the com-
bination of the tree and the menorah communicates, not a simultaneous en-
dorsement of both Christian and Jewish faith, but instead, a secular celebration
of Christmas coupled with an acknowledgement of Chanukah as a contempora-
neous alternative tradition."' 120
The Allegheny decision may be insignificant. After all, the Supreme Court's
struggle to formulate and apply a cohesive establishment doctrine over the years
has achieved little success. As a result, establishment precedent is merely a se-
ries of confusing and seemingly unconnected decisions. In this light, Allegheny
,may represent no more than an extension of the Court's miserable record in the
establishment context and the endorsement test may prove as ephemeral as
other previously dominant tests. 12 1 The logical conclusion is that Allegheny will
be an isolated decision that will affect subsequent cases only sporadically.' 2 2
The Court often has declared its unwillingness to bind itself to any single test. 12 3
For example, in Lynch the Court stated that there is "no fixed, per se rule"
capable of ready application. 12 4 It reasoned that the establishment clause
"erects a 'blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the circum-
stances of a particular relationship.' ",125
A variation of this argument contends that adoption of the endorsement
test in Allegheny has more to do with results than with analyses. Thus, the
Court will apply the endorsement test when necessary to reach an intended re-
sult, but will discard it when its application is not helpful.' 26 Although the
118. Id. at 3114 (plurality opinion).
119. Id. (plurality opinion).
120. Id. at 3114-15 (plurality opinion). In reaching this conclusion, the Court used Justice
O'Connor's "objective observer" concept previously introduced in her Wallace concurrence. See
supra notes 108-13 and accompanying text.
121. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upheld practice oflegislative prayer as socie-
tal tradition to the exclusion of Lemon test); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) (held that the
Lemon test applies only to laws that afford a benefit to all religions, not to provisions that purport-
edly discriminate among religions).
122. The Court's record in applying the Lemon test suggests several possibilities for future appli-
cation of the endorsement test. One possibility is that the Court may treat Allegheny as an exception
and return to the Lemon test. The Court followed a similar path in Marsh, 463 U.S. at 783. See
supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text (discussion of Marsh). Another possibility is that the
Court may confine the endorsement test to establishment clause cases involving government-spon-
sored symbols, leaving Lemon to regulate statutes and other government practices. Finally, the
Court could just replace the Lemon test with the endorsement test.
123. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
124. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984).
125. Id. at 679 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971)).
126. The establishment issue has divided the Court for years. Justices have tended to be unwill-
ing to compromise their ideological views; consequently, majority opinions have reflected the shift-
ing balance of the Court's composition. For example, following Lemon the Court utilized
accommodationist concepts until Wallace. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984); Marsh v.
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices White, Powell, Rehnquist,
and O'Connor in each case, wrote for the majority in both Marsh and Lynch. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at
670; Marsh, 463 U.S. at 784. Chief Justice Burger has remained loyal to accommodationist views as
have Justice White and Justice Rehnquist. In the meantime, Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun
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endorsement test was adopted by a majority, the Court failed to agree on its
application.127 This lack of consensus suggests that the Court may have as
much difficulty applying the endorsement test as it did applying the Lemon
test.128
Notwithstanding the above caveat, Allegheny potentially represents more
than a mere continuation of the Court's erratic record in the establishment
clause area. First, Allegheny marks the Court's first express adoption of the
endorsement test. By all accounts, Lynch should have controlled in Allegheny;
instead, the Court rejected Lynch in favor of Justice O'Connor's endorsement
test. Second, Allegheny marks the Court's first use of the endorsement concept
to uphold a governmental practice; in previous decisions the Court sometimes
used the endorsement concept as an additional method for invalidating prac-
tices,12 9 but never before has it employed the concept to validate a governmental
practice. Finally, the Allegheny Court applied the endorsement test to two dif-
ferent symbols and obtained divergent results. 130 Through consistent applica-
tion of the test, the Court upheld the constitutionality of one display while it
invalidated the other. In past cases, majorities have adopted either accomoda-
tionist or absolutist positions;131 by uniformly applying the endorsement test in
Allegheny, however, the majority implicitly forged a path between these
extremes.
Allegheny's significance is threefold. First, it departs from the Court's prior
record of unpredictability in establishment clause cases. 132 Second, it represents
a shift in the Court's focus from substantive to symbolic goals. 13 3 Third, it illus-
(although Justice Blackmun has not been as rigid as Justices Brennan and Marshall), and Stevens
have sided with absolutist views. See Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. 3086 (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
White siding with accommodationist view; Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens siding with ab-
solutist view; Justice Blackmun splitting between accommodationist view with respect to menorah
and absolutist view with respect to crche); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (Chief Justice
Burger and Justices White and Rehnquist siding with accommodationist view; Justices Brennan,
Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens siding with absolutist approach); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668
(1984) (Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and Rehnquist siding with accommodationist ap-
proach; Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens siding with absolutist view); Marsh v.
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and Blackmun siding with
accommodationist approach; Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens siding with absolutist ap-
proach). In Wallace, Justice Powell, a former member of the Lynch majority, shifted to the absolut-
ists' side. See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 39. Following Wallace, Justice Kennedy replaced Chief Justice
Burger and proved to be equally loyal to accommodation. See Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3134 (Ken-
nedy, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor, who sided with the majority in both Lynch and Wallace, has
remained the swing vote. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 670; Wallace, 472 U.S. at 39. In Allegheny, Justices
Blackmun and O'Connor were the only two Justices who voted both to uphold the menorah and to
invalidate the crkhe. See Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3093. Justice Blackmun and, to a greater extent,
Justice O'Connor, likely will continue to cast the deciding votes.
127. A majority of the Court agreed on the adoption of Justice O'Connor's test and its applica-
tion with respect to the crhche. Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3093. With respect to the menorah, how-
ever, Justice Blackmun wrote alone, while Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, O'Connor,
Scalia, and Kennedy concurred in judgment. Id.
128. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
129. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987); School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473
U.S. 373 (1985); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
130. See supra notes 27-34 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 41-85 & 98-102 and accompanying text.
132. See infra notes 135-62 and accompanying text.
133. See infra notes 163-75 and accompanying text.
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trates a shift from a doctrine characterized by dichotomy to one characterized
by neutrality.134
The Court's rejection of Lynch and adoption of the endorsement test re-
flects the dissatisfaction present within the Court since it first examined the es-
tablishment clause in 1947. The development and adoption of Justice
O'Connor's test represent a break from the Court's prior record in establishment
clause cases; it exhibits an effort by the Court to move forward in developing a
revised and more workable doctrine.
Over the past four decades the Court has shifted back and forth between
extreme absolutist and accomodationist positions.135 This dichotomy began in
Everson 136 and has dominated the establishment issue ever since. 137 The first of
two competing considerations inherent in the establishment clause is the interest
in absolute separation between church and state. 138 Balanced against this inter-
est is the countervailing principle that the first amendment prohibits states from
hampering "citizens in the free exercise of their own religion.' 1 39.
The Zorach 140 decision introduced the concept of accommodation into the
Court's establishment doctrine. Although the Court did not retreat from its
separationist 14' terminology,142 it contrasted this concern against the need for
accommodation. 143 The Court took a significant step toward solidifying a com-
prehensible establishment doctrine in Lemon. The Lemon test used the underly-
ing policies of both Everson 144 and Zorach.145 Although the Lemon decision
recognized both absolutist and accomodationist concerns, 146 it emphasized the
absolutist approach.147
The Court's dissatisfaction with the Lemon test increased with successive
134. See infra notes 176-82 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 41-85 & 98-102 and accompanying text.
136. 330 U.S. 1 (1947); see supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text (discussing Everson).
137. See supra notes 41-120 and accompanying text.
138. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.
139. Id. at 16.
140. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
141. The words "separationist" and "absolutist" are used interchangeably.
142. The Court, echoing Everson, still asserted that the first amendment requires complete sepa-
ration between church and state. Zorach, 343 U.S. at 312. Although the Everson decision upheld a
challenged statute, it is most often remembered for its harsh dicta concerning the "wall of separation
between church and State." Everson, 330 U.S. at 16; see supra note 44.
143. Zorach, 343 U.S. at 312.
144. See Beschle, supra note 41, at 171 ("Lemon is, no doubt, a faithful elaboration on the ra-
tionale (if not the holding) of Everson"). Professor Beschle has noted:
This is not to say that Chief Justice Burger intended Lemon to strongly endorse "separa-
tion" as an ideal. Indeed, he rejected "total separation" as "not possible in an absolute
sense." . . . [The wall is ... maintained "to prevent, as far as possible, the intrusion of
either [church or state] into the precincts of the other."
Id. at 171 n.124 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971)).
145. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614 ("Our prior holdings do not call for total separation .... Some
relationship between government and religious organizations is inevitable") (citing Zorach, 343 U.S.
at 312).
146. See supra text accompanying notes 55-58.
147. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 68
ENDORSEMENT TEST
applications. The Lynch 148 opinion clearly signaled the imminent abandonment
of the Lemon test.149 Justice O'Connor's dissatisfaction with the majority's rea-
soning in Lynch prompted her to write separately to clarify the Court's estab-
lishment doctrine.150 Although both the concurrence and dissent in Lynch
disagreed over the result under its particular facts, they agreed on the reasoning
to be employed. 151
In Wallace v. Jaffreet 52 the Court shifted to adopt a separationist ap-
proach.15 3 Justices Powell and O'Connor, who each filed separate concurring
opinions, joined a majority otherwise comprised of the original Lynch dissent-
ers. 154 The majority drew heavily upon many of the concepts introduced in
Justice O'Connor's Lynch concurrence.1 55 Justice Powell wrote separately to
reaffirm the principles embodied in the Lemon test.156 Rather than arguing the
Lemon test's merits, however, Justice Powell merely asserted that the test had
been the only formula ever adopted by a majority of the Court.1 57 In essence,
his argument expressed the view that a flawed but established standard was bet-
ter than an untested standard. Justice Rehnquist urged that the Court discard
the Lemon test altogether.158
In light of the discord over the Court's establishment doctrine, it is not
surprising that the Court began looking for alternatives. Justice O'Connor had
introduced and refined her test over the previous five years.1 59 The f6ur dissent-
ers in Lynch took particular notice of her views. 160 In Wallace,1 61 the Court
chose not to adopt her endorsement test and chose instead to apply loosely some
of the concepts it embodied.1 62 The fact that the majority balked in Wallace
allowed Justice O'Connor the opportunity to develop her test further. Thus the
148. 465 U.S. 668 (1984); see supra notes 76-85 and accompanying text (discussing Lynch).
149. See Beschle, supra note 41, at 169. According to Professor Beschle, "the five-majority...
introduced the analysis by noting merely that 'we have often found [the Lemon test] useful' and
stating that 'we have repeatedly emphasized our unwillingness to be confined to any single test or
criterion in this sensitive area.'" Id. (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 679).
150. Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3102 (plurality opinion).
151. Id. at 3103 (plurality opinion).
152. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
153. See supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text.
154. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 39.
155. See supra notes 86-96 and accompanying text (discussing Justice O'Connor's concurrence
in Lynch).
156. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 63 (Powell, J., concurring).
157. Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
158. Id. at 108-10 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
159. See School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 398 (1985) (O'Connor. J., concur-
ring in the judgment and dissenting in part); Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 711
(1985) (O'Connor, J, concurring); Wallace v. Jafree, 472 U.S. 38, 67 (1985) (O'Connor, J. concur-
ring in judgment); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
160. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 697-98 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The four dissenters included Jus-
tices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens. Id. at 694.
161. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
162. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 57-61 ("In applying the purpose test, it is appropriate to ask 'whether
government's actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion' .... [W]e must ask 'whether
the government intends to convey a message of endorsement or disapproval of religion.'" (quoting
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690-691 (O'Connor, J., concurring))).
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Court's adoption of Justice O'Connor's test in Allegheny was a logical step in its
search for a more workable establishment clause doctrine.
Allegheny is also significant in terms of its shift from substantive to sym-
bolic goals.1 63 While substantive jurisprudence concerns limiting certain types
of government activity, 1 " a symbolic understanding focuses on eliminating the
perception of impermissible government activity. 165 Substantive policies charac-
terize most of the Court's establishment doctrine history. 166 Only recently has
the Court begun to formulate a doctrine founded upon symbolic
interpretations. 167.
Lemon identified the "three main evils against which the Establishment
Clause was intended to afford protection: 'sponsorship, financial support, and
active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.' "168 The Lemon test,
and in particular its entanglement prong, focused on guarding against these evils
by providing a measure of how much government involvement in religious af-
fairs was excessive. By delving into the actual mechanics and details of the
church-state relationship, the Lemon analysis can only yield a substantively ori-
ented result-a result dictating which specific government activities must be
curtailed.
Unlike the Lemon test, which concentrates on the concrete, the endorse-
ment test focuses on the abstract.' 69 Specific government activities, in and of
themselves, are irrelevant; the crucial issue is the message that the specific gov-
ernment practice conveys. 170 As Justice O'Connor explained in Lynch,
163. See Marshall, supra note 4, at 495-500.
164. Id. at 513.
165. See Loewy, Rethinking Government Neutrality Towards Religion Under the Establishment
Clause: The Untapped Potential of Justice O'Connor's Insight, 64 N.C.L. REV. 1049, 1050-51 (1986).
166. See Marshall, supra note 4, at 500-14. The establishment clause is also designed to protect
religious minorities, Galanter, Religious Freedoms in the United States: A Turning Point?, 1966 Wis.
L. REV. 217, 288-95, and to prohibit government practices that impair religious freedom by coercing
or influencing religious beliefs, Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling
the Conflict, 41 U. Prrr. L. REV. 673, 674 (1980).
167. See Marshall, supra note 4, at 514-21; see, eg., School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473
U.S. 373, 397 (1985) (school district programs providing classes at public expense to parochial
school students violated the establishment clause in that the programs had the "primary or princi-
pal" effect of promoting religion); Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710-11 (1985)
(Connecticut statute providing observers of the Sabbath with the absolute right not to work on their
Sabbath violated the establishment clause because it impermissibly advanced a particular religious
practice); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 58-61 (1985) (Alabama statute authorizing one-minute
period of silence for prayer in public schools violated the establishment clause because the legislative
intent behind adoption of the statute was to endorse religion and had no secular purpose); Lynch v,
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 681-87 (1984) (city-sponsored seasonal creche display did not violate the
establishment clause because the display had the secular purpose of celebrating a holiday recognized
by Congress and any benefit to religion by the display was too remote or incidental to constitute
endorsement).
168. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S.
664, 668 (1970)).
169. "In the establishment inquiry, 'the concrete,' is the challenged government action, and 'the
abstract' is the issue whether that action denotes improper endorsement." Marshall, supra note 4, at
513.
170. As Professor Marshall has explained:
It is the message denoted by the government activity that is critical. For example, assume
a state provides direct financial payment to a minister. The establishment harm is not in
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"[e]ndorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full
members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adher-
ents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community. Disap-
proval sends the opposite message."' 171 What is critical, then, "is that a
government practice not have the effect of communicating a message of govern-
ment endorsement or disapproval of religion [because] [i]t is only practices hav-
ing that effect... that make religion relevant, in reality or public perception, to
status in the political community."1 72
The difference in approach between the majority's rationale and Justice
O'Connor's reasoning in Lynch is apparent in each party's treatment of
Marsh.'73 For example, "[tlhe Lynch majority employed Marsh comparatively:
to forbid the use of the creche, 'while the Congress and legislatures open sessions
with prayers by paid chaplains, would be a stilted overreaction contrary to our
history and to our holdings.' "174 In contrast, Justice O'Connor in Lynch har-
monized the result in Marsh by explaining that
legislative prayer.., is a form of acknowledgement of religion "that
serve[s], in the only wa[y] reasonably possible in our culture, the legiti-
mate secular purposes of solemnizing public occasions, expressing con-
fidence in the future, and encouraging the recognition of what is
worthy of appreciation in society." The function and history of this
form of ceremonial deism suggest that "those practices are not under-
stood as conveying government approval of particular religious
beliefs."17 5
Finally, Allegheny is significant because it represents a shift toward doctri-
nal neutrality.' 76 Prior to Allegheny the Court's establishment clause formula
reflected a dichotomy. Everson first established the competing tensions given
form in the absolutist and accomodationist approaches. 77 Although the Court
did not, in later cases, strictly construe the Everson opinion, that case has re-
mained influential. Thus, prior to Allegheny, the establishment clause formula
did not change. Although the Court wavered between the absolutist and ac-
comodationist approaches, the underlying goal was separation between church
and state. The debate did not concern whether separation was desirable, but
rather how much separation was desirable. The absolutists emphasized the first
amendment's anti-establishment concepts while the accomodationists empha-
sized the amendment's free exercise principles. Lemon perpetuated the Everson
the payment. It is in what the payment symbolizes. For, example, for many, financial
payment to a minister employed by a public school will symbolize improper state endorse-
ment of religion, while payment to a minister in the military will not.
Id. at 513.
171. Lynch v. Donnelly, 403 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
172. Id. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
173. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983); see Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3102 n.46 (plurality
opinion).
174. Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3102 n.46 (plurality opinion) (quoting Lynch, 365 U.S. at 686).
175. Id. (plurality opinion) (citations omitted) (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 693 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)).
176. See Beschle, supra note 41, at 171-91; Loewy, supra note 165, at 1047.
177. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
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concepts. 178 Logically, then, application of the Lemon test produces results
characteristic of separationist ideology. In contrast, a test formula founded on
symbolic concepts does not.
Lemon, by limiting the degree of entanglement between church and state,
necessarily produces separationist results. Justice O'Connor's test, however,
substitutes neutrality for separation. 179 In her view, the establishment clause
does not require separation, but only requires the government to remain neutral
in its dealings with religious organizations. 180 Government endorsement of one
religious organization over another, or of religion over no religion, is not neutral
and is therefore unconstitutional.181 The crucial question is not whether the
government activity in question has achieved the proper degree of separation,
but instead, whether it sends a message of endorsement. 18 2
In his dissent in Wallace, Justice Rehnquist criticized the majority for bas-
ing its analysis on Everson's "wall of separation" concept.183 The essence of his
argument was that the establishment clause was never "intended to erect 'a wall
of separation between church and State.' "184 "It is impossible," he concluded,
"to build sound constitutional doctrine upon a mistaken understanding of con-
stitutional history, but unfortunately the Establishment Clause has been ex-
piessly freighted with [Thomas] Jefferson's misleading metaphor for nearly 40
years." 185 If Justice Rehnquist's interpretation is correct, then the Lemon test,
or any other test founded upon substantive principles, is ill-suited to produce
consistent results. A variation of Justice Rehnquist's argument is that the
founding fathers did intend to separate church and state, but only as a starting
point; the framers' ultimate goal was neutrality, with separation merely as a
means to achieve that end.18 6
Regardless of the founding fathers' intentions, it may no longer be feasible
to interpret the Constitution as requiring a wall of separation between church
and state. 18 7 In today's complex and modern world, it is virtually impossible to
prevent interaction between government and religion.' 88 During post-revolu-
tionary times the level of government activity was minimal; government was
178. See supra notes 56-66 and accompanying text.
179. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The Establishment Clause prohib-
its government from making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in the
political community." (emphasis added)).
180. See Loewy, supra note 165, at 1049-51.
181. Id.
182. See Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3102 (plurality opinion).
183. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 107 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
184. Id. at 91-92. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145,
164 (1879)).
185. Id. at 92 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
186. See Beschle, supra note 41, at 178-79.
187. Id. at 171-73. Professor Beschle has argued that separation, regardless of whether intended
by the founding fathers, is simply impossible in the modern age. According to Professor Beschle,
separation is "[a] concept easily understood in an overwhelmingly Protestant eighteenth century
society, and one which once accepted would not be difficult to implement in that same society, [but]
has neither of those attributes today." Id. at 172.
188. Id. at 172.
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therefore less likely to interfere with religion. 189 Additionally, colonial America
was a Protestant nation.1 90 Today, however, there are dozens of religious de-
nominations, many regularly interacting with their communities.191 Conse-
quently they are more likely to come into contact with the government.
1 92
Unlike separation, neutrality does not require, or even encourage, total govern-
ment noninvolvement.1 93 As a practical matter, then, in modern society neu-
trality provides a sounder foundation upon which to formulate an establishment
doctrine.
Any workable "test" for alleged establishment clause violations must ad-
dress several identifiable conflicts inherent in the issue.194 One conflict results
from cultural heritage: 195 certain religious symbols, acknowledgements, and ac-
commodations lie beyond the scope of the establishment clause. 196 As Chief
Justice Burger observed in Lynch, "We are a religious people whose institutions
presuppose a Supreme Being." 197 Religious expression is common throughout
the cultural history of the United States. Examples include the national holidays
of Christmas and Thanksgiving, the national motto "In God We Trust," the
189. Id.
190. Id. Professor Beschle has noted the significance of the Protestant component in colonial
America:
[During the colonial period], America was a Protestant nation. Even Americans who held
strong religious convictions belonged to churches with theological roots relatively compati-
ble with the view that religion was properly a private matter between the believer and his
God.
Id. Religions, during colonial times, focused on the direct relationship between the believer and
God. Id. at 172 n.128. The Great Awakening of the 1730s and 1740s was characterized by the
concepts of individual conversion, choice, and rebirth. Id.; see M. MARTY, PILGRIMS IN THEIR
OWN LAND 107-28 (1984).
191. See Beschle, supra note 41, at 172-73. Professor Beschle has noted that United States'
religious tradition "draws heavily on the thought of Augustine, who expounded on the distinction
between the 'city of God' and the 'city of man.'" Id. at 172. As the number of denominations has
grown, the "City of God" and the "City of Man" have expanded their borders and religion has
undergone fundamental changes. As Professor Beschle has explained:
Religion no longer asserts merely the right to believe and worship, but also regards as
essential the obligation to create a better world. At the same time, government no longer
considers its sole obligation to be keeping peace so that individuals may fulfill themselves,
but actively works to facilitate the individual's welfare. Consequently, no boundary exists
along which to erect a wall of separation.
Id. Professor Beschle has further explained that the "rise of the 'social gospel' in nineteenth-century
Protestantism and the integration into American society of large numbers of Catholics and Jews,
whose religious traditions were more closely related to a sense of community than to individualism,
insured religious involvement in government affairs." Id. at 172-73.
192. Id. at 172-73.
193. Id. at 174 ("neutrality connotes lack of favor or disfavor").
194. See Marshall, supra note 4, at 504.
195. Id. at 507 ("jITihere are religious acknowledgments, symbols, and accommodations in the
public culture that are beyond first amendment purview .... This phenomenon will be termed
'culture heritage.' ")
196. Id. (" '[A] de facto establishment of religion prevails throughout the land.'" (quoting M.
HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 11 (1965))).
197. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 675 (1984) (quoting Zorach v. Clausen, 343 U.S. 306, 313
(1952)); see also Marshall, supra note 4, at 508 ("Religion is simply a fact of public life"). The Lynch
Court also noted that "[t]here is an unbroken history of official acknowledgement by all three
branches of government of the role of religion in American life from at least 1789." Lynch, 465 U.S.
at 674.
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"one nation under God" language in the Pledge of Allegiance to the American
Flag, and the traditional prayer given prior to each legislative session.19 8
Although history cannot validate otherwise unconstitutional practices, 99 the
Court has declined to declare these activities unconstitutional. 20 0 Instead, the
Court has recognized through accommodation that, "government action has
'follow[ed] the best of our traditions' and 'respect[ed] the religious nature of our
people.' ",201 Balanced against these cultural traditions are antiestablishment
principles. Any successful and satisfactory establishment clause doctrine must
reconcile these competing values.20 2
A second establishment conflict, apparent within the text of the constitu-
tion, 20 3 is between establishment and freedom of religious exercise. 2° 4 Although
the first amendment states that "Congress shall make no law respecting the es-
tablishment of religion,"' 20 5 it also states that "Congress shall make no law...
prohibiting the free exercise" of religion. 20 6 Thus the Constitution simultane-
ously forbids governmental establishment of religion and governmental interfer-
ence with its free exercise. 207 An establishment formula must strike a balance
between these forces; an extremist position under one clause necessarily violates
the other clause.
The Everson Court was correct in concluding that the founding fathers in-
tended the first amendment to require separation between church and state.20 8
The more difficult question, however, is whether the framers intended separation
to be an end, or instead, merely a means to some other desired goal such as
neutrality.20 9 The answer is significant because in today's modern society, in
198. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 676-77. Professor Marshall has argued:
National holidays such as Thanksgiving and Christmas, even if partially "secularized,"
have strong religious bases. Our cities are named Corpus Christi and San Francisco, our
parks named Zion, and our mountains named Sangre de Cristo. Our mottos and emblems
are replete with religious references. Our regulatory programs are pervaded with religious
exceptions.
Marshall, supra note 4, at 507-08; see Aronow v. United States, 432 F.2d 242 (9th Cir. 1970); John-
son v. Board of County Comm'rs, 528 F. Supp 919 (D.N.M. 1981).
199. Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 1321 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
200. See, eg., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 795 (1983) (upholding Nebraska legislature's
practice of opening each session with prayer); see Smith, The Special Place of Religion in the Consti-
tution, 1983 Sup. CT. REV. 83, 100-01 (discussing the Court's respect for cultural heritage).
201. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 677-78 (quoting Zorach v. Clausen, 343 U.S. 306 (1952)).
202. See Marshall, supra note 4, at 509 ("There are certain religious symbols and practices that
the establishment clause leaves untouched. Establishment doctrine must reconcile anti-establish-
ment principles with a 'de facto establishment' reality.").
203. See supra note 4.
204. See Marshall, supra note 4, at 504-07. The establishment clause's tension with the free
exercise clause is well documented. See Choper, supra note 166; Kurland, The Irrelevance of the
Constitution: The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Supreme Court, 24 VILL. L.
REv. 3 (1978); Marshall, Solving the Free Exercise Dilemma: Free Exercise as Expression, 67 MINN.
L. REV. 545 (1983); Merel, The Protection of Individual Choice: A Consistent Understanding of
Religion Under the First Amendment, 45 U. CHI. L. Rav. 805 (1978).
205. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
206. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
207. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.




which the administrative state touches the lives of its citizens in numerous and
diverse ways, 210 separation has become an obstacle to the achievement of neu-
trality. 211 Consequently, an establishment doctrine premised on the goal of sep-
aration is by its nature fundamentally ill-suited to achieve the ultimate goal of
neutrality.
In Allegheny the Court chose neutrality over separation. 212 The Court's
adoption of Justice O'Connor's endorsement test represents a realization of the
impracticality of achieving neutrality through the goal of separation. This rul-
ing has laid the groundwork for the development of an establishment formula
more consistent and enduring than any doctrine the Court has adopted in the
past.
The endorsement test promises to provide the Court with a sound analytical
framework for deciding establishment clause cases because it is consistent with
the overall posture of the first amendment.213 The founding fathers recognized
that in a pluralistic society citizens come from diverse religious backgrounds or
may even adhere to no particular religious beliefs at all.214 Whatever else the
establishment clause may stand for, at the very least it mandates that the "gov-
ernment may not demonstrate a preference for one particular sect or creed" over
another. 215 Notwithstanding historical practices and long-standing traditions
that the government has upheld in the past, the first amendment has always
required complete respect for religious diversity in society.216
The endorsement test captures the "essential command" 217 of the first
amendment by incorporating the antidiscrimination principle inherent in the es-
tablishment clause.218 It recognizes that in a pluralistic and modern society in
which religion and government necessarily come in contact, there will be partic-
ular religious groups that wish to impose their beliefs upon the rest of the com-
munity. 219 The Allegheny test also recognizes that in a society of majority rule
the government will confront pressures to show preference to particular faiths.
The endorsement test acknowledges that if the government is to remain neutral
it cannot "endorse the religious practices and beliefs of some citizens without
sending a clear message to nonadherents that they are outsiders or less than full
members of the political community."'220
It is doubtful that the Allegheny decision will make the Court's establish-
ment clause scrutiny any less difficult. The endorsement test requires the Court
to engage in what Justice Kennedy has tagged a "jurisprudence of minutiae"22'
210. Allegheny, 109 S. Ct at 3135 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
211. Beschle, supra note 41, at 178.
212. See supra notes 179-82 and accompanying text.
213. See Beschle, supra note 41, at 190.
214. Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3119 (O'Connor, J, concurring).
215. Id. at 3107 (plurality opinion).
216. Id. at 3106 (plurality opinion).
217. Id. at 3119 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
218. Id. at 3110 (plurality opinion).
219. Id. (plurality opinion).
220. Id. at 3119 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
221. Id. at 3144 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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because it examines the particular contexts in which the government employs
religious symbols. 222 The test is sensitive to unique circumstances, is highly
context specific, and requires difficult line drawing; it therefore may not always
yield a unanimous results. 223 Nevertheless, the endorsement test synthesizes
and gives meaning to much of the Court's establishment clause history and is
capable of providing a consistent and workable doctrine to assist the Court in
establishment clause inquiries in the future. By harmonizing the establishment
clause inquiry with the overall mandate of the first amendment, the Allegheny
decision represents an initial step toward more consistent and predictable judi-
cial decisionmaking in this area.
CHRISTOPHER S. NESBIT
222. Id. at 3107 (plurality opinion).
223. Id. at 3119 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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